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Prior to the economic crisis. realestate prices. wage rates , 
interest rates. and the exchange rate had been derailed on a 
large scale from the levels reflective of Korea’s econonl1C’ 
fundamentals. This distortion was the ultimate source of Korea ’s 
economic crisis but was remedied only partially during the last 
five years. lea띠ng the task of economic reform as incomplete 
Although a consensus 띠ew about the fundamental source of 
Japan’s economic problems has not yet emerged. a chronol앵y 
of Japan ‘ s lost decade casts doubts about the popular view that 
financial reform is the sufficient condition for a durable recovery 
in ,Japan. We suggest that Japan’s effort should be directed to 
improving producti띠ty of nontradable seπice sector and to 
sol띠ng the problem of popula디on a핑ng. 
Keywords: Korean economic crisis. Japan’s lost decades. 
Economic reform 
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I. Introduction 
Th is essay seeks lessons from the Korean experience in struc-
tural reform that could be of benefit to Japan in re씨ving its 
economy. Korea has been congratulated for overcoming macro-
economic catastrophe in one year. This spectacular achievement is 
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100ked upon as represen디ng the benefits of structural reform. 
thereby drawing aUention from economísts ínterested in the 
ch머1enging issue of how to resuscitate Jap와lese economy. 
The ori핑n of Korea’s economic crisis resided in a distorted price 
system which forced national income to be allocated out of 
corporate opera디ng surp1us into 1abor compensa디on. This pattem 
of disproportionate income al1ocation had persisted consistently for 
a very 10ng time and caused the corporate sector to accumu1ate a 
huge amount of debt and. consequently. a staggering amount of 
non-performing 10an in the financia1 sector. The structura1 reform 
in Korea during the 1ast five years cou1d rectify the distorted price 
system to the extent that a startling recovery ensued right after the 
crisis. 1n retrospect. however , the distortions which drove the 
nation into the economic crisis were remedied on1y partial1y. 1eaving 
the task of economíc reform as íncomp1ete. This experience 
highlights that chief sources of economic prob1ems shou1d be 
identified correctly ín the first place and then determined efforts 
shou1d be made to tackle the identified prob1ems. 
The process of Japanese chronic recessíon is very different from 
and more complicated than that of Korea's economic crisis. It 
seems to us that a consensus view about the fundamental source 
of Japan’s pro1onged slump has not yet emerged either. Various 
diagnoses and prescríptions have been suggested by foreign 
academics. foreign govemment officials. and staff members of 
intemationa1 economic organizations. We believe. however. that on1y 
the Japanese are in a position to ascertain the ultimate causes of 
their recession and prescribe the right solutions for it because no 
other countIγ in the wor1d has ever suffered the same kind of 
recession as Japan has. We propose. however. that Japan’s 
economic reforms shou1d be directed to improving productivity of 
nontradab1e service sector. We a1so suggest that the prob1em of 
popu1ation aging is one of the u1timate sources of Japan’s 10st 
decade. 
1n Section II. we start with describing the origin of Korea’s 
economic crisis. i.e. the distorted price system. We then proceed in 
Section III to evaluate to what extent the distortions were corrected 
during the 1ast five years. 1n Section IV. we summarise a 
chron010gy of Japan ’s 10st decade and elicit some lessons which 
may be usefu1 for re띠띠ng the Japanese economy. Concluding 
remarks are included in Section IV. 
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11. Origin of Korean Economic:: Crisis 
During the economic crisis in 1998, Korea’s macroeconomlC 
performance ch윈1ged dramatically in a disastrous way; much more 
disastrous than anyone could have imagined. Its annual real 
growth rate in 1998 plunged to - 6.7 percent, its lowest since the 
Korean War (1 950-3). In 1999 , however, the real GDP growth rate 
recorded 10.9 percent, a remarkable 17.6 percentage poínts 
improvement from - 6.7 percent in the prevíous year. Such a 
sudden and abrupt recovery from recession is unprecedented in the 
world histmγ of economícs since the World War 11. The economic 
recovery was spectacular indeed, but 야le overall adjustment process 
can be characterized as an ‘adjustment at the cost of gro\\딴1. ’ 
Nllmerous explana디ons have been put forth for Korea’s cllrrency 
and financial crises using different approaches .l However , the 
ultimate callse must have been the low profitability of the corporate 
sector, which was under a crushing burden of financial debt. It is 
ironic that, instead of being flush ‘wíth cash, the corporate sector of 
a country which had been praised for splendid achievements in 
economic growth should have suffered such deep and extensive 
indebtedness. At the heart of the low profitability was a deeply 
entrenched incentive system which directed an excessive amount of 
corporate revenue into labor compensation. The bulk of whatever 
income generated at 밍1y point during the busíness cycle was 
distributed outside the corporate sector through the traditional 
income allocation pattems. The corporate sector ine띠tably piled up 
more and more of debt and the financial sector, in turn , was 
saddled wíth 하1 excessive burden of non-performing loans until the 
economy became extremely vulnerable to extemal shocks. 
A. Disproportionate Income Allocation Pattem 
For the last three decades , the Korean economy has expanded 
vigorously. The nominal GDP has increased by 219 times , from 2. '7 
trillion won in 1970 to 596.4 tεillion won in 2002. The dollar-
lReferences are abundant. To n없ne a few , Calomiris (1998). Corsetti. 
Pesenti. and Roubini (1 999). Dooley (1997. 2000). Feldstein (1999a. 1999bl. 
Frankel and Roubini (2001) , Furrnan and Stiglitz (1 998). Krueger (1 9971 , 
Kn핑man (1998) , Lane and Phillips (200이， Radelet and Sachs (1 9981. 
Summers (200(기 
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FtGURE 1 
TRADlTIONAL PATIERN OF ALLOCATION OF NATIONAL INCOME (1) 
denorninated per capita GDP amounted to 10,006.2 dollars in 2002. 
37 times as big as that in 1970. The national income. defined as 
the sum of labor compensa디on and operatlng surplus.2 has 
increased by 191 times when aggregated at 1995 constant p디ces . 
While the economy had developed enonnously. the qu려itative 
pattem of income allocation has not changed at 허1 during this 
period. Figure 1 displays the traditional allocation of the national 
income bebNeen compensa디on of employee and opera디ng surplus. It 
shows that labor compensa디on has increased a t a much higher 
rate than the operating surplus. More specifically. labor com-
pensation increased 282 times from 1970 to 2002. while operating 
surplus increased 127 디mes. Clearly. the Korean economy had 
allocated consistently a much hi양ler percentage of corporate profits 
into labor compensation during this entire period ‘ 
Figure 2 redraws Figure 1 putting 와1 of national income. 
operating surplus 킹ld labor cornpensa디on at a baseline of 100 at 
1970. 1980. and 1990. the first years of each decade. Figure 2 
reveals 하1 interes디ng fact that the growth in labor compensa디on 
has exceeded that of the operating surplus by large margins at 
specific 디mes during 삼le following three sub-periods. The first was 
2Equivalently, the national 1ncome c없1 be obtained by ad띠ng subsidies to 
GOP and then subtracting from it. indirect taxes. depreciation and net 
factor incomes from abroad. 
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FIGURE 2 
TRAoITIONAL PATTERN OF ALWCATION OF NATI0NAL INCOME (II) 
late 1970s, which includes the second 011 shock (1 977-80); 야m 
second was late 1980s and early 1990s, when increases in real 
wages were ex:plosive and the realestate bubble had emerged and 
ex:p와1ded 찌gorously (1988-9 1); 없1d the thtrd was mid 1990s. which 
overlaps 바1e cyclic허 recession after the expansion of the semi -
conductor industry (1995-6). 
lf labor compensation increases at an excessive rate with respec t 
to operating surplus. it can be looked upon as a profit squeeze 
(Sachs 1979). Figure 3 shows the ordinary income to sales of each 
industry 윈1d indicates by means of shaded area the three periods 
of profit squeeze, Le. 1977-80, 1988-91. and 1995-6. The ordinary 
income to sales declined markedly during the periods of profi'~ 
squeeze with only mlnor exceptlons.3 
The pe디ods of profit squeeze are closely related with cyclical 
recessions. The period from 1977 to 1980 includes the contrac .. 
디on없y phase of the second business cycle4 (February 1979 .. 
1'he exceptions are 히ectricity . gas . ste와n industry in 1977 -80 reflectin‘: 
high energy prices, and construction industry. realestate service industry. 
없ld tr와1sporta디on . warehouse . communicatlon Industry In 1988-91 떠fectecl 
mostly by severe realestate bubble and expanded consumption of 
au tomobiles. 
"The officia1 datlng of buslness cycle expanslons and contractioml 
published by the Korea Nationa1 Statistica1 Office staπs from the year 0:: 
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FIGURE 3 
ORDINARY INcoME TO SALES AND PEruODS OF PROFIT SgUEEZE 
September 198이 ， which was triggered by the second oil shock. The 
period from 1988 to 1991 covers the fourth contractionary phase 
(J킹lUary 1988-July 1989), which followed a spe따acular export 
boom.5 The period frorn 1995 to 1996 over1aps the s iXth 
contractionary phase (March 1 996-August 1998), which started 
when the terms of trade suddenly plurnrneted. 
It is natural that operating surplus of corporate firms declines in 
cyclic려 recessions. So the ques다on is how could labor payment 
have continued to rise in those recessions at about the same rate 
1970. 
5It is called “ three-low boom" meaning international interest rates. oil 
prices. and the value of domestic curren양 were low enou핸 to warrant 
compe때veness of Kore킹1 expoπ products. 
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FIGURE 4 
PA1TERN OF NATIONAL INCOME ALLoCATION lN OrHER COUNTRIES 
as during boom years? Another question 1s how come opera섭n당 
surplus could have never exceeded labor payment for more than 
twenψ years during which the profit squeeze was not observed, 
except in 1974? When the economy 1s slu잃1sh. opera다ng s따plw> 
is squeezed by recession itself and additlonally by steady increase 
of labor payment. When the economy 1s 1n a good shape. operatln갱 
surplus growth cannot exceed that of labor compensatlon. As a 
matter of course. labor compensation has grown up at a faster rate 
납1an opera디ng surplus for the last three decades. 
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Figure 4 shows the pattem of national income allocation of 
sixteen major industrial countries fo11o뼈ng the same method used 
in Figure 2. It tums out that Korea is the only country that has 
exhibited the singular pattem of disproportionate income allocation. 
Japan. the Netherlands. Bel명um. Fr밍lce and Spain a110cated more 
income to labor compensation in the 1990s. but unlike Korea. their 
opera디ng surplus in the 1980s had increased as fast as (Japan) or 
much faster (the Netherlands. Belgium. Fr윈lce 밍ld Spain) than 
their labor compensa디on. 
By alloca디ng more income to the labor sector a11 the times. the 
profitability of Korean corpora디ons had been consistently d없naged. 
leading to the accumulation of an enormous volume of corporate 
debts and non-performing loans. 
B. Distoned Price System As the Source 01 the Mis-Allocation 따 
Income 
There must be a strong and deeply entrenched incentive 
structure which had brought about the singular pattem of income 
mis-a11ocation. From a macroeconomic perspective. in Korea. real 
estate prices. wage rates. interest rates. and the exchange rate 
comprise the system of core prices (Park 없ld Cho 2002). Prior to 
the economic crisis. these core prices in Korean economy had been 
derailed on a large scale from the levels reflective of Korea’S 
economic fundamentals (Cho 1997). π1is kind of distortion in the 
price system is responsible for the disproportionate income 
a11ocation. or equivalently. the traditional profit squeeze. Households 
had enjoyed incomes that were artificially high at the cost of 
corporate profits. while deepening corporate indebtedness. Further-
more. the market forces to correct the inadequacy of the price 
system had been par머yzed. a110wing the distortions to persist un디1 
the crisis broke out. Although it is hard to present quantifiable 
evidences. there are several facts that can be put forth in proof of 
our arguments. 
Among other 삼lings. the ever-increasing realestate prices were 삼le 
primary factor of the distortion of the price system. Higher re외­
estate prices induced higher rents. higher service costs. higher 
housing expenses and higher living costs. Since Korean people have 
a characteristic incIination toward realestate ownership (Kim and 
Park 2001). higher realestate prices raised target levels of saving 
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from the so-called ‘down-payment motive. ’ In order to meet the 
higher target sa띠ng levels and the higher living costs , workers hεd 
to demand higher nominal wages because household loans were not 
readily accessible under a strictly regulatory regime. In this way ‘ 
increases in realestate prices caused real wages to grow faster than 
the labor produc디vity. 
On 삼1e other hand , corporations were preoccupied with ex-
panding sales and were not verγ concerned about profitability. They 
were able to obtain loans from financial institutions only if they 
had sufficient realestate assets as collateral. 0삐ng to the lack I)f 
global standards of operation in the capital market and the 
unreliability of corporate financial statements , even troubled firrns 
were not discriminated in the capital market and their executive 
officers didn’t have to worηr about being ousted. Regardless of the 
profitability of projects , investment for expanding the size of the 
cornpany continued unabated , leading to a chronic and excessive 
dernand for labor and funds. The natural result of this was that 
real wages increased faster than labor producti찌ty and interest 
ratεs were higher than the rate of return on investment. 
Korean economy was , after all , a risk-free economy. Until the 
outbreak of the econornic crisis , for exarnple , financial cornpanies 
preferred corporate bonds to the governrnent bonds because they 
could not find any practical reason to hold safe assets. Tbe 
ever-increasing realestate prices were the single rnost irnportant 
buttress propping up the risk-free economy. Stripped of cosmetics , 
the Korean economy prior to the econornic crisis was a bubble 
econorny in the sense 삼1at it could operate only if realestate prices 
continuedl to rise. 
Realest3.te prices suddenly stopped rising and began to decline 
moderately in the second half of 1991 (Figure 5). The most 
important engine of the bubble economy was out of seπice. Firms 
could no longer expect to see their operating losses offset by 
increases in value of their assets. Nevertheless , they continued to 
expand as a rnatter of common practice from behavioral inertia. 
Their excessive dernand for labor and funds remained unchanged , 
rnaintaining rent , real wage , interest rate at excessively high levels 
until the end of 1997. 
Along with the cease of the realestate bubble expansion , 
fundamental factors of Korean economy such as the manner of 
resource allocation, the pattern of consumers’ consump디on-Ieisure 







74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 9‘ 96 98 00 02 
FIGURE 5 
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FIGURE 6 
GROSS SAVING RATE AND W EEKLY WORKING HOURS 
choice. the composition of household expen이ture. and biπh rate 
etc .. went through important structural changes in the early 1990s 
(Figure 6). Looking back, with these dramatic ch없1ges in economic 
fundamentals , 산le early 1990s was the era in which Korea should 
have started extensive structural reforms in search of a new growth 
strategy. But it was also at this time that the massive volume of 
foreign capital started to flow into Asian countries. inclu띠ng Korea. 
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FIGURE 8 
INVESTMENT RATIO AND RATE OF RETURN TO INVESTM ENT 
giving rise to an over-confidence in Kore와1 economy and over -
valu ation of the exch없1ge rate. A1암10U방1 단ley became aware of the 
rising compet피ve threat from China and Southeast Asian countries. 
instead of searching desperately for the ways to upgrade national 
competitiveness. the Korean people whiled away their time in 
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euphoria at their recent economic achievements. 
Meanwhile , distortions in price system became more serious and 
symptoms of macroeconomic disequilibrium began to stand out. The 
acceleration in the current account deficit in 1996 is one of salient 
manifestation (see Figure 7). Another import없11 one was the 
over-investment that emerged in the late 1980s. Figure 8 presents 
Korea’s total investment ratio and three different estimates of the 
rate of retum to total investment (Park 2003). It can be seen that 
Korean economy had been loosing dynamic efficiency since 1989 , 
meaning that the return to investment was less than the invest-
ment expenditure. The excessive investment lasted for nine years 
without any interruption and was only put to an end by the 
economic crisis. 
III. Distortions in the Price System Before and After the 
Economic Reforms 
Prior to the currency crisis , every one of the core prices , which 
are realestate prices , wage rate , interest rate , and exchange rate , 
had deviated greatly from their equilibrium leve1s. After the 
economic crisis , the exch밍1ge rate has returned successfully to a 
realistic level. In our judgement, the single most important factor of 
the rapid and solid recovery since 1999 was the sizable 
depreciation in the won per dollar exchange rate. The cut in 
interest rates also contributed to the rapid macroeconomic recoveπ 
and financial and corporate sector reforms were indispensible for 
the adjustment in the interest rates. But in recent years the 
interest rates were lowered too far and have been held down for too 
long, disturbing 삼le adjustment in realestate prices. A new 
realestate bubble emerged in late 2001 and then expanded 
띠gorously until recently. Fin외ly， not뻐thstanding the labor market 
reforms , we could not find any solid evidence of the a며ustment in 
wage rate. Wage rigidity in the labor market became aggravated in 
the post-crisis years. 
A. Realestate Prices B얻fore and After the Economic Rξforms 
A change in realestate prices effectively redistributes wealth 
between genera디ons and social classes , either directly or indirectly. 
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TABLE 1 
RATIO OF TOTAL LAND V ALUE TO NOMINAL GDP 
Korea Jap없1 U.K. U.S.A. 
1985 2.9 1.2 1.1 
1986 3 ‘ 7 1.3 1.0 
1987 4.7 1.5 1.0 
1988 4.8 1.9 1.0 
1989 9.03 5.3 1.9 1.0 
1990 9.03 5.4 1.6 0.9 
1991 8.41 4.7 1.5 0.8 
1992 7.32 4.1 1.3 0.7 
1993 6.00 3.9 1.3 0.7 
1994 5.07 3.8 1. 1 0.6 





Sources: Data for Japan. U.K. and U.S.A.; Korea Appraisal Board (1998). 
Data for Korea; Kim 하ld Park (2001) 
In a country where the pension system is not fully developed. 
increases in rea1estate pIices could contribute to socia1 stability by 
securing for home owners and land10rds adequate wea1th to see 
them through their retirement years. However, hi양1er rea1esta"te 
prices can 허so impose a huge poten디al economic burden on the 
young generation. 
At the peak of the rea1estate bubble in the early 1990s. tot꾀 
land va1ue was slightly more than nine times nomina1 GDP (see 
Table 1) . For a compaIison , at the pe와‘ of rea1estate bubble :in 
1990. 야1e ratio of total 1없1d va1ue to nomina1 GDP in Japan was 
~ust’ 5 .4. Even Jap없1. then the foremost leader in m하1ufacturing 
produc디씨ty in the world. could not endure that much high land 
prices and the bubble went bustl This tells us that Korean 
realestate bubble back in the early 1990s was truly monstrous.6 
~eaders should be reminded that the land price of Korea in Table 1 was 
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TABLE 2 
OFFICE RENTS AND ÜCCUPANCY COSTS 
rentll 때뼈I핑 대피dng 때때ng 때뼈ng 때때ngrar빼ng 때뻐ng 






























Zurich. Switzerland 59.14 11 
Midtown Manhattan 57.13 12 
Frankfurt, Gennany 57.07 13 
Glasgow. Scotland 56.05 14 
Mumbai(Bombay) 53.04 15 
Geneva, Switzerland 52.49 16 
Hong Kong 52.38 17 
Milan, ltaly 5 1.74 18 
Seoul, South 
51.56 

















































































14 n.a. n.a. n.a. 21 
8 10 12 12 12 
9 12 14 14 10 
18 20 21 n.a. 15 
11 7 6 6 5 
24 31 n .a. n.a. 25 
6 5 556 
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Source: CB Richard Ellis Global Research and Consulting, Global Market 
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Rents (Various Issues). 











aggregated according to publicly appraised land prices which were not 
higher than 60-70 percent of market prices in 1990s. Allowing for the 
underestimation in official apprais외， the total land value. evaluated at 
market prices. would have amounted to far more than 10 디mes of nominal 
GDP. 
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Th.e ratio of total land value to nominal GDP started to decline in 
1991 both in Japan (Okina et a l. 2:001) and in Korea. In Korea. the 
ratio had fallen back to 3.68 by 1997 from 9.03 in 1990. Durin딛 
this time the nominal GDP increased 2.5 times. while the total land 
value remained almost unchanged. In Japan. the ratio fe11 to 3.7 by 
199Ei from 5 .4 in 1990 as total land value dropped by 22.8 percenl 
while the nominal GDP increased by 12.6 percent. In light of the 
fact that ~Japan is still suffering from the aftermath of the bust, i1 
may seem at first that Korea’s adjustment to its much more severe 
realestate bubb1e had been much smoother and more successfu: 
than that of Japan. In Korea. after a11. the bubble did not bust. 
The harmful side-effects of the realestate bubble. however. d iC 
not magica11y disappear in Korea. Instead. the bubb1e exercised ε 
veηr unfavorable influence on the Korean economy in a roundaboul 
way. By the mid-1990s. the annua1 interest obliga디on of leasing c 
house in metropolitan areas was much higher than ha1f of the 
industrγwide average annual salaη. In an economy characterized 
by such exorbitant housing expenses. workers wi11 natura11y 
clemand higher labor payment. The realestate bubble also led tc 
extremely high office rents and occupancy costs. Immediately before 
the currency crisis. Seoul was 4tll or 5th most expensive city in 
the world with regard to ren디ng office space (see Table 2) 
Furthermore. the high land prices discouraged 야le govemment from 
purchasin당 land for development of the social infrastructure. an깅 
as a result. transporta디on and delivery costs and warehous t' 
charges etc. rose sharply. 
During the economic crisis. realestate prices went down for th(' 
first time i.n modern Korea. The economic contraction was so much 
appalling that the govemment did everything in its power tc, 
prevent further decline in realestate prices. fearing that a vicioUE 
circle of nega디ve growth and declining realestate prices wou1d b(' 
set in motion. A number of revisions to the tax laws and to rules 
of policy aclministration were made in order to encourage 
investments in realestate assets and to promote construction 01 
residential buildings. The problem was that these policy measureE 
were not withdrawn even after the economy had achieved a 
remarkable recovery in 1999 and 2000. Rea1 economic growth waE 
10.9 percent and 9.3 percent during these two years. respectively. 
Policy measures which served to sustain realestate prices wer(' 
maintainecl until the second half of 2002. 
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FIGURE 9 
HOUSING PRIcE INDICES (1 995= 100.이 
Meanwhile, interest rates beg;하1 to decline signific킹1tly in 앙1e 
second h려f of 2001 , σiggering a lending boom. More than half of 
household lending reporte버y made its way into the realestate 
market, aw와‘ening the realestate bubble which had been dormant 
for about a decade (see Figure 9). This time , 야1e new realestate 
bubble was inflated by housing prices rather than by land prices 
없ld rent increased a lot faster 삼1an building prices (see Figure 9 
킹ld Table 3). 
Al삼lOugh the rate of increase in housing prices has moderated 
recently, housing prices are s디11 unreasonably high; high enou뱅 to 
AN ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS lN KOREA 265 
TABLE 3 
INCREASES OF HOUSING PRICES BY PERIOD 
1987.8-1991.4 1998.11-2002.7 Comparison 
Sale Lease on Sale Lease on Sale Lease on 
(A) deposit (B) (C) deposit (D) (C/A) deposit (D/B) 
Detached 55.9% 70.6% 5.7% 32.5% 0.10 0.46 house 
Tenement 86.2% 94.3% 15.4% 60.6% 0.18 0.64 house 
Apartrnents 125.2% 10 1.0% 46.1% 91.5% 0.37 0.91 
Composite 77.8% 82.0% 27.0% 66.0% 0.35 0.81 index 
trigger. sooner or later. a strong demands for higher wages as we 
had witnessed in the 1990s. Office buil며ngs are also too much 
expensive yet. As of March 2003. Seoul was ranked at the 19th 
most expensive city in the world for renting a square foot of offke 
space. more expensive than Washington D.C .. the Silicon Valley in 
the San Francisco Bay Area. downtown Manhattan. Chicago. 
Toronto. Taipei. or even Singapore (see Table 2). 
The current realestate bubble must have contributed significantl.y 
to the economic growth in 2001 and 2002 by encouraging priva1.e 
consumpUon through the wealth effect. The real growth rate in 
2001 and 2002. 3.1 percent and 6 .4 percent. respectively. were 
higher than those of Korea’s trading paπner countries during 다)e 
same period with only one excep디on: China. In the long-run. 
however. the realestate bubble will not only cause real wage to rise 
faster than labor productivity. it will 외so bring about higher rents. 
higher service costs. higher transportation costs. higher delive1Y 
costs and higher warehouse charges. higher housing expenses and 
higher li띠ng costs. All of theses developments will serve to erocle 
corporate surplus as more and more income is allocated outsicle 
the corporate sector. That the govemment failed to prevent the 
reemergence of the realestate bubble is extremely regrettable 
because the benefits of structural reform may come to nau방11 in 
야le long-run as a result of it. Without defla디ng realestate bubble 
adequately. it would be impossible for Korea to achieve a sustain-
able economic groV\πh in the future. 
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FIGURE 10 
RATE OF lN얹EASE OF NOMINAL WAGE. CPI. AND μBOR PRODUCTlVTIY 
B. Wage Rates B닫fore and After the Economic Reforms 
Since the second oU shock and up until the mid-1980s, the 
government pursued heavy-handed income policy to curb runaway 
wage inflation , effectively discoura밍ng wage increases during 삼lat 
time. However, as soon as 야le oppressive regulations on labor 
union activi디es were lifted in late 1987 , nominal wage began to 
increase at 없1 accelerating rate from the fourth quarter of 1987 
onwards. During the 10 years from 1987 to 1996, nominal wages 
consistently rose more rapidly than the sum of CPI 하ld the labor 
producti찌양 (see Figure 1이. 
Table 4 compares Korea’s per capita gross national income (GNI) 
and hourly manufacturing wage with those of the U.S . , Jap따1 ， 
Germany, the U.K. , Hongkong, and Singapore. As the table clearly 
summarizes, since the late 1980s, 삼1e dollar-denominated hourly 
manufacturing wage in Korea became greater 삼lan or equ려 to 
those of Hongkong and Singapore, where per capita income was 
twice as high as 야lat of Korea. A case study poin잉 out that in the 
mid-1990s , the total labor expenses per worker in one of Korea's 
leading comp하ùes in heaη， industry sector amounted to 45 
thousand dollars a year, which was hi양ler than that of companies 
producing 삼le same products in the U.S. (Cho 1997). 
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TABLE 4 
GNI AND MANUFACfURlNG WAGE: KOREA VS. Fo앉IGN COUNTRlE:S 
U.S.A. Germ윈1Y U.K. 
Period 
Wage(A) GNI田) A/B Wage떼 GNI(B) A/B Wage(.쩌 GNI(B) A/B 
1980-87 0.15 0 .13 1.08 0.20 0.18 1.09 0.25 0.25 0.98 
1988-97 0.43 0.30 1.42 0.36 0.32 1.08 0.43 0 .43 1.00 
1998-2000 0 .40 0.24 1.63 0.33 0.30 1. 14 0 .36 0 .31 1.03 
Japan Hong Kong Singapore 
Period 
wage때 GNI田) A/B Wage(A) GNI(B) A/B Wage(.쩌 GNI(B) A/B 
1980-87 n.a. 0 .1 8 n.a. 0.82 0.34 2 .15 0.77 0 .34 1.89 
1988-97 0.53 0 .24 1.98 1. 10 0 .44 2 .51 0 .99 0 .45 2 .17 
1998-2000 0.46 0 .23 1.97 0.77 0.34 2 .25 0.69 0.35 1.94 
As Figure 10 shows. the level of nominal wage declined in 199딩 
when the Korean economy fel1 into the severe economic recession . 
The won-per-dol1ar exchange rate also jumped up dramatical1y 
du디ng 암le currency crisis. A10ng with the value of currency. the 
dollar-denominated nominal wage and nat10nal income declinecl 
sharply in 1998. Naturally. from 1998 to 2000. Korea’s ratio of uni r.. 
wage per hour to per capita GNI declined relative to Hongkong ancl 
Singapore. but the ratio did not change agalnst Japan or the U. K. . 
In fact. it even rose relative to the U .S. and Germany (see Table 4) . 
This suggests that the hi방1 wages which prevailed for 10 yeanì 
prior to the economic crisis may not have fully corrected du디ng the 
pe디od of economic reform. For the four consecu잉ve years. frorn 
1999 to 2002. real wages rose faster than labor producti씨양· 
Especia1ly. in 2002. the increase in real wages exceeded that of 
labor producti띠ty by 6.1 percentage points. the widest margin since 
1989. Excluding 1989. 삼1is was the widest margin in 24 yean‘ 
since 1978 (see Figure 11). 
Korea has made serious efforts to make the labor market more 
flexible. The labor laws were amended 없ld firms were allowed “ 
large scale lay-off as a preventive measure ag며nst outright 
bankruptcy. But. it is hard to find any solid evidence of improve -
ment in labor market flexibility. Tradition려 wage set디ng behavior 
became more rigid after the economic crisis. 







REAL WAGE GROWTH RATE NET OF LABOR PRODUCfIVI1Y GROWfH RATE 
The fo11o뼈ng equatlon measures 삼le degree to which nominal 
wage gro\\πh rate( L7ln(찌아) is affected by the inflatlon rate( L7 ln(PJ) 
하ld by ch킹1ges 1n unemployment( L1 ln(Ut)). The ra디o of coefficients 
in this equatlon, - a /β ， indicates how much unemployment rate 
needs to change in response to changes in the inflation rate in 
order to preserve 야le nominal wage growth rate (Bell 1986). 
L1 ln(Wt) = a L1 1n(Pt) + β L1 ln(Ut) + e! 
If a is estimated to be bigger than β in absolute terms , we c윈l 
interpret that the nominal wage responds to the inflation rate more 
sensitively than to changes in unemployment.7 Equivalently, we can 
say that 야le nominal wage setting is more favorab1e for preserving 
real income, regardless of changes in labor market situation. Table 
5 summarizes estimation results of the wage equation when Korean 
quarterly data are used. 
The table indicates that wage ri명dity during 야le period from the 
fourth quaπer of 1987 to the end of 1993 (see Figure 1 이 was 
significantly stronger than in 삼le pre찌ous pe디od. From 1994 to the 
7Theoretic려ly. 야le coefficient a must be pos띠ve 없ld the coefficient β 
must be negative. 
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TABLE 5 
RESULTS OF WAGE EgUATION ESTlMATION 11 
estimatlon 디밍dity 
L1 ln(P) L1 ln(이 rigidity period p u parameter par킹netεr 
198OQ1 1.06541 -0 . 18938 
5.63 
0 .63082 -0.10153 
6 .21 
-87Q3 (1 2.3037) (2.94177) (2.29419) (3 .51186) 




-93Q4 (1 6.5270) (0.31497) (1 .96026) (2.56542) 
1994Q1 2.08500 -0.05035 
4. 14 
0 .85284 -0.15310 
5.57 
-97Q4 (13.5273) (1.25908) (0.88653) (2.09426) 




-03Q1 (24.3262) (4.80659) (40.9243) (5.93642) 
Notes: 1) Rate of increases used on the right hand panel are compared with 
pre띠ous quarter. on the left hand panel. quarter on quaπer. 
t -values are in parentheses 
2) During 삼11s pertod. coefficient of the rate of increase of unemploy-
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FIGURE 12 
GROwrH RA.TE OF NI. OPERATING SURPLUS. LABOR COMPENSATION 
end of 1997. wage rigtdity was rnoderated sornewhat. but it became 
aggravated dr하natica1ly since 1998. The wage setting behavic r 
which prevailed during the pe디od of realestate bubble retumed and 
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was actually more severe. n야withstanding the economic crisis and 
the labor market reforms. The cyclic외 recession in 2001 was such 
a relentless blow to the business sector that opera디ng surplus 
declined as much as it did in 1998. the crisis year. But labor 
compensation continued to grow 찌gorously (see Figure 12). so the 
corporate sector faced yet another profit squeeze (see Figure 2). 
C. Interest Rates Bξfore and AJter the Economic R，앙orms 
In Korea. domestic interest rates had been much higher through 
most of its recent history than intemational rates (see Figure 13). 
The total volume of corporate debt was also very large. and 
therefore. corponite financing expenses were inordinate compared 
with sales (see Figure 14). Although the ratio of opera디ng income 
to total assets was reasonably high (see Figure 15). ordinary 
incomes after financial expenses were megere (compare Figure 16 
with Figure 15). This implies that a dominant proportion of 
operating income was going towards financial expenses. Figure 17 
and Figure 18 show opera디ng income to sales and ordinary income 
to sales of manufacturing industries in the U.S .. Japan. Taiwan. 
and Korea. Figure 19 and Figure 20 compare those countries’ ratios 
of operating income and ordinary income to total assets in their 
manufacturing sectors. We can see that Korea’s opera디ng income 
relative to sales 없ld total assets was the highest but that the 
country’s ordinary income relative to sales and total assets had 
been the lowest. 
Entering the second half of 2000. domestic economy fell into 
another recession as a result of the world-wide slump in the 
information and technolo잃T índustry. Export growth rate fell down 
lower 야lan - 20 percent for July and August in 2001. and the 
recessíon was exacerbated by the September 11. 2001 terrorist 
attack in the U.S. As a counter-cyclical measure. the Bank of 
Korea lowered the target call rate on a number of occasions. 
bringíng it down from 5.25 percent in January 2001 down to 4.0 
percent ín September 2001 (see Figure 21). When household 
len며ng boom (see Figure 22) became conspicuous 밍ld realestate 
bubble was 띠gorously exp킹lding. the B밍lk of Korea raised the call 
rate by 0.25 percentage points in early May in 2002. Since then. 
the call rate had been maintained at 4.25 percent for the following 
twelve months during which household debt mounted to 밍1 
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OPERATlNG INCOME TO TarAL AsSETS BY INDUSTRY 
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ORDINARY INCOME TO TOTAL AssETS BY INDUSTRY 
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enormous size and rea1estate bubb1e inflated by overflowin당 
short-term funds , almost risking socia1 solidarity.8 
The Bank of Korea‘s decision to maintain the cal1 rate at such a 
10w 1eve1 was hard1y persuasive because the rea1 economic growth 
rate in 2002 recorded a solid 6.3 percent. In JanuaIγ 2003. 
another recession arrived and the Bank of Korea lowered the targe • 
call rate 1wice in May and July 10 3.75 percent. Short-term ancl 
10ng .. term interest rates followed the downward path of the call rate 
(see Figure 21 and Figure 23). 
As Figure 13 disp1ays , interest expenses of c(πpora디ons a1so 
contJnued to decline untJl recen t1y. Since the economic crisis 
corpora디ons were forced to reduce debt level 윈ld recently the tota: 
debt ratio of the corporate sector has recently fal1en to rough1y the 
same 1evel as in the U.S. As the debt ratio declines , and also 
reinforced by declining interest rates , the ratio of ordinary income 
to sales rose to its highest in 2002. Comparing Figure 18 with 
Figure 17 , we can see that the ratios of ordinary income to sales 
and to total assets dramatically improved in 2002 , while the ratios 
of operating income to sales and to total assets did not exhibit any 
significant improvement from the pre띠ous year. The difference is , 01 
course , due to the dramatic reduction in non-operating expenses , 
the bulk of which were obviously interest e)φenses. 
While the govemment largely failed to control real estate prices 
and wages in recent years , it seems to have accomplished lowering 
interest rates very successive1y. However , the rates have been 
10wered too far and have been held down for too long ruining the 
task of controlling realestate prices and wage rates. Interest rates 
are 80 10w that they have actually helped fuel the rise in real 
estate prices and wages. Table 6 estimates the simplest form of 
caus써ity from interest rates to real estate prices. It tums out that 
decreases in interest rates acceler앉ted the rise in housing prices 
from Ju1y 1999 to Apri1 2003 , the period when the current 
8In late 1980s, when the realestate bubble was expan띠ng violently, 야le 
govenlment legislated a new tax law to restrict propeπy right on land and 
residency buildings depending on type of use , location , 따ld size. Criticism 
burst out that the new law did not fit with the principle of capitalistic 
constitution of Korea. The govemment. however, enforced the law arguing 
that it was to be deemed as a cost to stabilize and maintain democratic 
capitalis디c society. The constitutional court of Korea judged in late 1990s 
that the law does not accord with the constitution. 
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FIGURE 22 
REAL GROwrH RATE OF HOUSEHOLD L END1NG (BANK1NG SECI'OR) 
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TABLE 6 
EFFECT OF INTEREST RATE ON HOUSING PruCE INDICES1l2131 
Period βl )'1 ß2 1'2 ß3 
1999:07-2003:04 
0.841 -0.295 0.846 -0.169 0 .839 
(0 .000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.144) (0.000) 
2001:07-2003:04 
0 .836 -0.751 0.854 -0.545 0.840 
(0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000) 
Period ~1 ηl ~2 η2 ~3 
1999:07-2003:04 
0.814 -0 .450 0.817 -0.246 0.813 
(0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.1551) (0.000) 
2001:07-2003:04 
0.799 - 1.041 0.813 -0.734 0 .802 
(0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.075) (0.000) 
Notes : 1) TotaJt = βlTot려(- 1 + 1'1 L1 DRt. TotaJt = ß2TotaJt 1 + y2 L1 CBYt. 
To떠1， = β~TOtaJ( - 1 + 1'3 L1 LRt. Aptt= ~IAptt 1 + η l L1DRt. 









- 1. 175 
(0.025) 
2) TotaJ denotes 와l-city composite index (see Figure 9) , Apt denotes 
려l-city apaπment index. DR is the weighted average of deposit 
rates at commerciaJ banks. CBY is three year corporate bond 
yie1d. 없ld I.R denotes the weighted average of 10an rates at 
commerciaJ banks. 
3) Numbers are estimated vaJu es of coefficients and p-v려ue of each 
parameters are in paren삼lesis. 
(~ 
10.80 -
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LoNG-TERM INTEREST RATES 
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realestate bubble emerged 하ld expanded (see Figure 1이 . If we 
restrict the estimation period to the shorter time interval during 
which interest rates fell sh와ply， Le. , from July 2001 to April 2003 , 
the coefficients of interest rates in the causality equation are 
estimated to be larger in absolute terms and to be more 
sta디stically significant. 
Interest rates in Korea , prior to the economic crisis , were too 
high. A sizable decline in interest rates was required to improve the 
profitability of the corporate sector. Corporate sector reforms forced 
business firms to begin paying down their enormous debts and 
helped lower the market interest rates by easing the traditional 
excessive demand for loans 밍ld bonds.9 
An effective macroeconomic policy approach to lowering nominal 
interest rates would have been lowering the inflation rate. However , 
since the second half of 2001 onwards , the decline in interest rates 
was mainly driven by the declining target call rate. To be sure , 
lower interest rates were called for in 2001 , as one of macro-
economic stabilization policy measures. The problem was that the 
call rate was maintained at such a low level throughout 2002 , 
when the real growth rate rose to 6.4 percent from 3.1 percent the 
previous year. 
Meanwhile , the Bank of Korea did not 핑ve any reliable sign려 
that the interest rate could be raised some 디me in the future , and 
consumers and investors felt assured of their expectations that 
interest rates would remain low for a long period of time. This led 
to an explosíve increase in demand for consumer loans , and 
financial institutions extended loans to households very aggressively 
because they were locked ín overheated compe디디on to preseπe 
their shares of the consumer loan market. What ís more , the 
financial supervision agency did not apply rigorous standards of 
financial soundness to the financial institutions until the end of 
2002 because it implicitly cooperated with the govemment in 
stimula디ng the economy as much as possíble. As a natural 
consequence , household lending íncreased at an alarming rate (see 
9Moreover, as the task of fiscal consolidation was accomplished well 
ahead of schedule. the consolidated central govemment balance tumed to a 
surplus of 1.08 percent of nominal GDP in 2000. from a deficit of 4.2 
percent in 1998 and a deficit of 2.7 percent of GDP in 1999. Consequently. 
the supply of govemment bonds shrank sharply in 2001 , contribu디ng to 
lowering long-term interest rates. 
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FIGURE 24 
FINANC버L DEBT/ GDP BY SECTOR(FLow OF FuNDS) 
Figure 22) . 
Along wi삼1 삼1e explosive increase in household len띠ng. 야1<:’ 
composition of sectoral debt has changed signific킹ltly. Figure 24 
displays the total and types of financial debt relative to nominal 
GDP since the 1990s. From 1998 to 2002. the ratio of total 
domestic debt to nominal GDP rose by 2 .0 percentage points. Thε 
government debt rose 4.0 percentage points because the central 
government ran sizable budget defìcits in the several years followin딛 
the economic crisis. Owing to the corporate sector reforms ‘ 
corporate debt declined by a remarkable 19.8 percentage points o:f 
nominal GDP. The debt-to-GDP ratio of public enterprises declined 
by 5.2 percentage points during the last five years. 3.6 percentage 
points of which occurred in 2002. Financial debt of privatε 
individuals. however. rose by tremendous 23.1 percentage points αr 
GDP. 20.4 percentage points of which occurred during the last twc’ 
years. 2001 and 2002. While household len띠ng increased at an 
alarming rate. a significant proportion of the loans was reportedly 
extended without rigorous credit screening. The number of credil; 
deliquencies rose to 2 .6 million by the end of 2002. and then to 
3.2 million by the end of May 2003. 
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D. Exchange Rate Bξfore and Ajter the Economic Rξforms 
One of the most important factors which forced the Korean 
economy into the cuπency crisis was the shortage of foreign 
reserves. Prior to the currency crisis. there had been a current 
account deficit for m뻐y consecutive years. draining the stock of 
foreign reserves (see Figure 끼. At the beginning of 1997. foreign 
reserves totaled about 30 billion dollars. which could afford 
commo버양 imports for only 2 months and 6 days. 1O The overvalued 
exch없1ge rate was the key cause of the chronic balance of 
payments deficit. although this point remains controversial in the 
academic arena. 
The Jap밍lese yen depreciated by about 40 percent from the 
second quarter of 1995 to the third quarter of 1997. During the 
same period. the Korean Won depreciated by only 18 percent. and. 
in terms of the real effective exchange rate. it appreciated by 8 to 9 
percent (see Figure 25). Both the Chinese govemment's massive 
one-time 50 percent devaluation of the yuan in the first quarter of 
1994 and the energe디C허 increase of Chinese share in Korea’s trade 
volume in the 1990s should have exercised a significant influence 
in this apprecia디on. 
It should be noted. however. that the overvaluation of the Korean 
won was not the only factor which can account for the current 
account deficit in the mid-1990s. The deficit can also be 
attributable to a huge deterioration in the terms of trade which 
occurred abruptly in 1996. The terms of trade fell by 4.6 percent 
in the first quarter of 1996. and then by 12.1 percent in the 
second half. y.o.y. (see Figure 26). In the mid-1990s. Korea’s five 
leading export products (semiconductors. iron 밍ld steel. petro-
chemicals. automobiles. and ships) accounted for more than half of 
Korea’s total expoπs. And the intemational prices for all of these 
five types of products dropped simultaneously in 1996. The decline 
in p디ces for semiconductors alone caused a staggering 10-billion-
dollar decline in exports. which amounted to 44 percent of the total 
current account deficit in 1996. 
Back in the mid-1990s. the Korean exchange market was not 
fully opened yet. so it was difficult to determine the correct relative 
value of the Korean currency. Accordin밍y. the exch와1ge rate could 
lOForeign reseπe at the end of 2002 c없1 afford imports for 9 months 없ld 
18 days. 
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NOMINAL AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE OF KOREA 
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not have adjusted flexibly enough in reaction to the abrupt and 
dramatic changes in the intemational prices of export products 잉ld 
in trade partner countries' exchange rates. 
Since 1999. after the over-shooting in exchange rate subsided. 
the Korean won has fluctuated at an average rate of about 1.200 
won per dollar. At the extremes. it has touched nearly 1. 100 and 
1.350 (see Figure 25). An exchange rate of 1.200 won per dollar 
implies that the Korean won has been depreciated by about 50 
percent compared with the pre-crisis pe디Od. 11 The real effective 
exchange rate shows a depreciation of about 22 percent compared 
with the rate in 1995-6. even higher than the rate prevailed during 
the “ three-low boom" period (see Figure 25). 
The exchange rate. after all. has retumed to a realistic level. It is 
interesting to note that three countries in East Asia have 
successively depreciated their currencies by about 50 percent. After 
China’s surprising one-time 50 percent depreciation of the yuan. 
the Japanese yen depreciated by 40 percent over a period of two 
and a half years staπing in the second quarter of 1995. Since the 
Korean won 띠d not adapt itself to these changes promptly. it was 
forced to do that via 삼le currency crisis situation in late 1997. 
After the currency crisis. the Korean won is depreciated roughly by 
50 percent compared with the pre-crisis period. 
Figure 26 shows that the deterioration in the terms of trade 
since the fourth quarter of 1999 was more serious in its duration 
and its depth than the one that occurred in 1996. This time. 
nevertheless. the current account balance remained a sizable 
surplus in the following years thanks to the big jump in the 
exchange rate. The sufficient exchange rate depreciation brought by 
야le currency crisis has been one of the kemel sources of economic 
growth during the last five years. 
IV. Lessons for Economic Reviva1 in Japan 
The persistent Japanese economic recession in itself has aroused 
cu디osi양 among economists for many years. and long lists of 
diagnoses and prescriptions have been suggested by foreign 
scholars. foreign govemment officers 하ld staffs from intemational 
llThe 밍lnu외 exchange rate in 1996. one year before the onset of the 
currency crisis. was 803 won per dollar. 
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economic organizations. ln most cases , their diagnoses were 
reasonable , but we should recall that their prescriptions may not 
be the rilght answers to the problems that Japan is currently 
facing. 12 The most typical examples are su똥es디ons regarding 
Jap,ill’s macroeconomic policy. It is evident by now that the 
expémsionary fiscal and monetary policies in the past did little to 
revive the Japanese economy. These policies might actu떠ly have 
made Japan’s economic problems more difficult to solve. Since no 
other countrγ in the world has ever suffered the s밍ne kind of 
recession as Japan has , we believe that only the Japanese are in a 
position to ascertain the ultimate causes of their chronic recession 
and prescribe the right solutions for it. 
What implica디ons can we deriv당 from the Korean experience in 
structural reform during the last fìve years7 The structural reform 
in Korea could rectify the distorkd price system which drove th컨 
country into the economic crisis to the extent that a startling 
recovery ensued right after the cri.sis. At the very least, corporate 
debt will no longer build to such extreme levels and bring about 
the same kind of financial crisis. 
From t:he macroeconomic perspec디ve ， however , the structural 
reform in Korea is incomplete yet. The distortions were remedied 
only pa띠며ly and some of them were even aggravated. And we 
have yet to find any reliable evidence to believe that the structural 
reform has improved efficiency in resource 머location significantly 
enough to permit sustainable gro\\πh 1 3 as promised in the literature 
(Alex밍lder et aL 1997) . πlis experience h1방llights that chief targets 
of economic reform should be identified correctly in the first place. 
Otherwise , after hassling with its unpleasant and painful aftermath , 
야le refonn would fail to eliminate the very causes that forced the 
nation to carry it out. 
Although Japan has been working on financial reforms for more 
than a decade , there still remains , allegedly, a huge amount of 
non-performing loans in the banking sector (Callen 밍ld Ostry 
200~‘). The slow progress of the financial reform is looked upon as 
the very obstacle to Japanese economic revival , especially when 
l2It took several ‘years’ for them to recognize and admit their mistakes in 
their policy recommendations for Korea and other Southeast Asian 
countries. 
l3That was what all of Korean people en띠saged when they endured paim; 
from the aftermath of the reform. 
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compared with Korea’s post-crisís performance. There ís. of course. 
pervasíve evídence that the adverse ímpact of the decline ín asset 
prices was magnified by the faílure of financíal system ín the early 
1990s (Bayoumí 2001). However. the breakdown of financíal system 
may not be the one and only source of Japanese persístent 
recessíon. If other factors than the financial system f;없lure were 
also behínd the chroníc recessíon. it would be hardly persuasíve to 
argue that economíc vitalíty would be restored πght away 야le 
comple디on of fínancíal sector reform. 
A. A Chronology oJ Japan's Prolonged Recession and Its 
Implications 
The character of Japanese chroníc recessíon ís very dífferent from 
and more complicated than that of Korea’s economíc crísis. The 
be밍nníng of the Japanese economíc dífficulties can be traced back 
to the mid-1980s. Since the Plaza Accord in 1985. 삼le Japanese 
yen underwent a truly massive currency apprecia디on. By the 
second quarter of 1995. the nominal exchange rate had declíned to 
84.4 yen per dollar. exactly one thírd of 250.7 yen per doll하 ín 삼le 
second quarter of 1985 (see Figure 27). During the three years 
from the second quarter of 1985 to the second quarter of 1988. the 
exchange rate appreciated 50 percent from 250.7 yen per dollar to 
125.6 yen per dollar. Consequently. 삼le ra디o of net exports to GDP 
declíned 2.7 percentage points ín five years from 3.9 percent ín 
1984 to 1.3 percent ín 1989. 
In response to the large scale exchange rate shock. the Jap밍lese 
government stimulated domestic economy 삼1rough an expansionary 
monetary policy. The official díscount rate was cut by half from 5.0 
percent ín December 1985 to 2.5 percent in March 1987 and was 
maíntained at 2.5 percent for the next two years (see Fígure 28). 
The result was more than offsetting the adverse impacts of the 
currency shock. The ratio of total investment to GDP rose by 4.8 
percentage points from 26.6 percent in 1985 to 31.4 percent in 
1990 (see Figure 29). And the average real GDP growth rate from 
1986 to 1990 recorded 4.9 percent. much hígher than 3.3 percent 
from 1981 to 1985. 
Unfortunately. however. for the Japanese. however. the asset príce 
bubble emerged and expanded 찌gorously in the meantime until ít 
went bust by 1991 (Okina et al. 2001). Along with the burs디ng of 
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MONTHLY CALL RATE AND OFF[C때L DISCOUNT RATE OF JAPAN 
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FIGURE 29 
GDP RATIOS OF NET EXPORTS AND TOTAL lNvESTMENT lN JAPAN 
the bubble. the financial system broke down and Japanese 
economy fell into a recession in 1992. The official discount rate 
was lowered aggressively from 6.0 percent in June 1991 to 1.75 
percent in October 1993. It was almost ineffective, however, for 
S디mula디ng 삼1e economy because the function of financial inter-
mediation was not rehab피tated. The Japanese economy could 
bottom out in October 1993, but the subsequent recovery was 
extremely slow and the average real GDP growth rate from 1994 to 
1995 was 1.3 percent. 
The proposition that the lirnited progress in financial reform is 
the cause of Japanese economic sluggishness seemed well justified 
in the early 19905. Since the mid-1990s , however. the failure in 
rehab피tating financial system was no longer the central element of 
the prolonged recession. Not only large Jap없1ese firms completed 
their shift away from bank loans by 1990 (Hoshi and Kashyap 
1999), sm려1 firms 외so could finance their investment pr애ects by 
their own gross corporate sa띠ng and fmancial assets from 1993 
onwards (Hayashi 없1d Prescott 2002). Above 려1， financial invest-
ment abroad by Japan sharply rose from 1995 to 1997 (see Figure 
3이 and surged into Asian countries inclu며ng Korea. which was a 
strong counter evidence of the view that the lack of credit supply 
restricted demand for funds in Japan throu땅lout the 1990s. More-
over. in explaining the extreme slow recovery in 1993 and 1994, Ito 
(1996) argues that the nega디ve effect of currency apprecia디on was 
more preponder없1t than the breakdown of financial intermediation. 
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By the mid-1990s. a new sort of obstacles to durable economic 
re찌V외 seem to have emerged. From 1995 onwards. Japanese 
exp야ts stopped its traditional increasing trend (see Figure 31). And 
it could be ascribed to the accelerated trend of overseas produc디on 
of Jap따lese manufacturing firms. Developments such as the burs디ng 
of the bubble economy. concems about the b없lking system. 
technological innovation related to telecommunication 없ld the 
escalation of 맹obal compe디디on were 외lege버.y responsible for the 
increase in overseas production (Development Bank of Japan 1996). 
However. the sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen from 155.3 
yen per dollar to 84.4 yen per dollar during the five years from the 
second quarter of 1990 to the second quaπ.er of 1995 must have 
been the critical source of the explosion of overseas production in 
the mid-1990s. 
In 1995. the official discount rate was lowered from 1.75 percent 
in March to 0 .47 percent in October. and a large scale public 
expenditure program was passed in autumn. Although these 
attempts were useful for improving corporate profitabilities. they 
were not able to stimulate the domestic economy as a growing 
number of manufacturers were investing abroad due to the strong 
yen. Meanwhile. the trade volume with Asian countries had 
increased sharply. so the currency crises in those countries in late 
1997 was a smashing blow especi외ly for Japan. The Japanese 
econoiny fell into a recession in 1998. the second time in the 
post-bubble era and the financial crisis reoccurred. Furthermore. a 
persistent deflation began to enervate the Jap와lese economy. 
Following the world-wide slump in the information and technology 
industry which occurred in the second half of 2000. 밍lOther 
recession arrived in 200 1, the third time in the post-bubble period. 
The chronology of Japan’s prolonged recession we presented 
above persuades us to harbor doubts about the popular view that 
financial reform is the sufficient condition for a durable recovery in 
Japan. Financial reform is no doubt an indispensible task for 
reviving the Japanese economy. but the breakdown of financial 
system may not be the one and only source of Japanese persistent 
recession. Although 삼le problems with the Japanese economy. such 
as large non-performing loans. inadequate fiscal p이icy. 납le liquidity 
trap. deflation. massive currency appreciation etc. are closely 
interrelated with each other. financial reforms alone may not 
automatically solve 허1 other structural problems. especially if the 
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reforms are of a kind that carried out in Korea during the last five 
years. 
B. Concluding Remarks 
In retrospect. momentum of economic growth of Korea cou:.d 
resume just as soon as 단le exchange rate adjusted to a realistic 
level. The sharp decline in interest rates also contributed 
trernendously to the economic growth in the post• crisis period. 14 In 
contrast. it is hard to identifY correctly which particular macro-
economic variables are responsible for the Japan’s lost decade. 
Furthermore. even if we succeed in idenUfYing the target variables. 
it is not easy to draft a structural reform agenda for adjusUng 
effectively the identified target variables. Considering recent 
Japanese market interest rates and the level 0아f g망overnme앉n따t budg，~ 
deficit a없n띠d so forth. macroeconornic variables may perhaps be 
irrelevant to reviving Japanese economy. 
In order to accomplish a durable recovery. we suggest that 
Japan ’s economic reforms should be directed to improving pro-
duc디vity (Porter et a l. 2000: and Hayashi and Prescott 2002). 
Especially. Ito (1996) argues forcefully that the tradiUonal slow 
productivi양 growth in nontradable sectors. such as construction 
and retail senηces. was responsible for the rapid real appreciation 
in the Japanese yen. We can easily deduce from his analysis an 
irnportant policy recornrnendaUon that Japan should try to encour 
age productivity growth in nontraclable sector rather than to pile up 
foreign reseπes in order to de외 with exchange rate problems. V.'e 
believe that this recommendation applies also to Korea. 
Before conclucling this paper. let us suggest one more policy 
recommendation regarcling the problem of population aging. Figure 
31 presents one of recent long-term forecast for Korea’ s real GDP 
growth rate through 2030. Thi딩 figure is excerpted from Park 
(2000) for which he built a large-scale annual macroeconomic 
model for the Korean economy. The figure predicts. surprisingly. 
14The average nominal exchange rate during 야le post-crisis period from 
1999 to 2003 is 1.214.3 won per dollar. 52 percent higher compared with 
800.6 won per dollar in the pre-crisis pe디od from 1992 to 1997. The 
adjustment in interest rates is also impressive. The average corporate bond 
yield (3Yrs) during the post-crisis period is 7.7 percent. 43 percent lower 
than 13 .4 percent in the pre-crisis period. 
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FIGURE 32 
A LoNG-TERM FORECAST FOR REAL AND POTENTIAL GDP OF KOREA 
(I'ruLLlON WON) 
that Korea's rea1 GDP is likely to contract starting in 2022. In his 
report. Park (200이 argues that fiscal exp밍lsion 킹ld monetary 
expansion whatsoever turned out incompetent to reverse 야le 
declining trends of re외 GDP since 2020s. 2020 1s 야le year by 
which 삼le 이d-age dependency ratio of Korea will reach 20 percent. 
and the size of population aged between fifteen to sixty-four will 
begin to decline. As the greying of the popula디on becomes 
pronounced. p디vate consump디on declines. the current account 
surplus rises. the exch하1ge rate appreciates. and the inflation rate 
declines throughout the entire decade of the 2020s. This situation 
seems qualitatively sirnilar to that of Japan ’s macroeconomy today. 
In 1990. 삼le old-age dependency ratio of Japan reached 20 
percent. and the size of population aged between fifteen to sixty 
four beg하1 to decline. Figure 32 suggests that the problem of aging 
population might be one of the ultimate sources of Jap하1’s chronic 
economic slumpS.15 Unfortunately for the Japanese. 삼le a sset bubble 
1 5y와‘.e note that Tumer et 0 1. (1998) also predict that. owing to popu-
lation aging. per capita real GDP in the U.S .. EU. and Japan will decline by 
10 percent. 18 percent. 뻐d 23 percent respectively by 2050. 
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might have happened to burst at precisely the moment - the early 
1990s - when the aging of the population began to exert significan t 
ne왕띠ve effect on Japan’s macroeconomic performance. 
Beyond the task of financial and corporate sector reform , Japan 
certainly has additional challenging tasks: Japan has to deal with 
the aging popula디on 밍ld the low productivity in nontradable 
seπice sector. These additional tasks would not be easy to 
accomplish. However , the Korean experience in structural reform 
during the last five years manifests that determined efforts should 
be made to tackle these tasks. Otherwise , Japanese economy wil1 
be exposed to economic difficulties recurrently. 
(Received 29 October 2003: Revised 19 Januarν 2004) 
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